LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Joan MacLeod Heminway*
Social enterprises—businesses that exist to generate financial and
social or environmental benefits—have received significant positive
public attention in recent years. However, social enterprise and the
related concepts of social entrepreneurship and impact investing are
neither well defined nor well understood.1 As a result, entrepreneurs,
investors, intermediaries, and agents, as well as their respective advisors,
may be operating under different impressions or assumptions about what
social enterprise is and have different ideas about how to best build and
manage a sustainable social enterprise business.
Indeed, the law governing social enterprises also is unclear and
unpredictable in respects. In particular, the application of business
associations law to specific questions involving social enterprises is
somewhat unseetled. This essay identifies two principal areas of
uncertainty and how they have the capacity to generate lawyering
challenges and related transaction costs around both entity formation
and ongoing internal governance questions in social enterprises. Core to
the professionalism issues are the professional responsibilities implicated
in an attorney’s representation of social enterprise businesses.
To illuminate legal and professional responsibility issues relevant
to representing social enterprises, this essay proceeds in four parts. First,
using as its touchstone a publicly available categorization system, the
essay defines and describes types of social enterprises, outlining three
distinct business models. Then, in its following two parts, the essay
focuses in on two different aspects of the legal representation of social
enterprise businesses: choice of entity and management decision making.
*
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See, e.g., Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 926 (2016)
(“The term ‘social enterprise’ does not have a precise definition and as such, while
often used, it is also commonly misunderstood.”); Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley,
What Is A "Social" Business and Why Does the Answer Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 278, 278–79 (2014) (“Many proponents of the social enterprise movement
have attempted to provide more precise definitions of ‘social entrepreneur’ or ‘social
enterprise.’ However, definitions in this area remain hopelessly fractured, often
conflicting, and almost always tautologically utilize the term ‘social.”’); Alicia E.
Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 223 (2013)
(“[A]dvocates and actors in the social enterprise sector have not agreed upon a single
definition of ‘social enterprise’ and . . . many terms are used to describe the various
organizational models on the value creation spectrum, including social enterprise,
triple-bottom line business, and social entrepreneurship.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Finally, reflecting on these two aspects of representing social enterprises,
the essay concludes with some general observations about lawyering in
this specialized business context.
I.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES

As businesses that “do well by doing good,”2 social enterprises
can come in many forms. A useful taxonomy is provided by the Social
Enterprise Alliance,3 which defines social enterprises as “[o]rganizations
that address a basic unmet need or solve a social or environmental
problem through a market-driven approach” 4 and categorizes social
enterprises into three general types based on the nature of their
engagement with social or environmental betterment. These three social
enterprise models are labeled: “Opportunity Employment,”
“Transformative Products or Services,” and “Donate Back.” 5 Social
enterprises of these kinds may be either nonprofit or for-profit firms
from a state business associations law or federal income tax law
perspective.
Opportunity employment social enterprises “employ people who
have significant barriers to mainstream employment.”6 Borderland Tees
is a business in Knoxville, Tennessee that exemplifies this type of social
enterprise. It is a t-shirt print shop that employs those needing some
See, e.g., Shinu Abhi, “Can Social Entrepreneurs Do Well by Doing Good? Blending Social and
Economic Value Creation”- An Investigation, 23 ACAD. ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. Aug. 2017, at
1 (defining for-profit social entrepreneurial ventures as “those ventures that blend
social goals with business goals and referred as ‘double bottom lines organisations’ or
‘bottom of the pyramid ventures.’”); Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and
Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 21
(2014) [hereinafter McDonnell, Committing] (defining social enterprises as “businesses
that have dual goals of making a profit for their investors while also pursuing social
goods, sometimes narrowly and sometimes broadly defined.”). Other commentators
have defined businesses in this space in similar terms. For example, Professor Dana
Brakman Reiser uses the term “blended enterprise” to mean an “entity that intends to
pursue profits and social good both in tandem and by making considered choices to
pursue one over the other.” Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual
Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010).
2

See What is Social Enterprise?, SOC. ENTER. ALL.,https://socialenterprise.us/
about/social-enterprise/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
3

Id.; see also Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in
Social Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 123 (2018) [hereinafter McDonnell, From Duty and
Disclosure] (“Social enterprises pursue a dual mission, founded to both generate profits
for their founders and investors while also independently pursuing other social goals.”);
J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise and Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?,
40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 765, 767 (2017) (describing social enterprises as “organizations
that use commercial means to reach social ends”).
4

5

See SOC. ENTER. ALL., supra note 4.
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social and financial help. This business model evolved from positive
outcomes observed in the employment of a mentally ill homeless man.
The rest is, as they say, history.
[W]e realized the power of this workplace model for
transformative ministry. So Bob and I decided to open a
separate print shop specifically for cultivating these
relationships. We called it Borderland Tees –
“Borderland” because we wanted to include people on
the borders or margins of our society, people who suffer
from what Mother Teresa called “a poverty of
relationship.” . . . We call it “Capitalism for the Common
Good.” We are not a job-training program, but
sometimes people find work. We are not a housing
ministry, but sometimes people find a place to live. We
are a ministry of individual relationships, not a program.
As Bob says, “God is in the retail business, not the
wholesale business.”7
Another prominent example mentioned on the Social Enterprise
Alliance website is Goodwill Industries, which states on its website that
its local organizations “meet the needs of all job seekers, including
programs for youth, seniors, veterans, and people with disabilities,
criminal backgrounds and other specialized needs.”8
Social enterprises engaged in providing transformative products
or services “create social or environmental impact through innovative
products and services.”9 Knoxville, Tennessee’s Love Kitchen is a classic
example of this type of social enterprise.
The Love Kitchen provides meals, clothing and
emergency food packages to homebound, homeless and
unemployed persons. We work with local agencies to
provide meals, secure used clothing, and donate services
in the hope of promoting the self-sufficiency of those
we serve. The organization has no paid staff; all
donations go to those who need it most. Our ultimate
goal is to provide nourishment for anyone who is hungry

7

Rev.Jenny Arthur, The Borderland Story, BORDERLAND TEES, https://

www.borderlandtees.com/our-story.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).Borderland Tees,
Our Story, https://www.borderlandtees.com/our-story.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
About Us, GOODWILL INDUSTRIES INT’L, INC., https://www.goodwill.org/about-us/
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
8
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and to establish a community center to serve as a safe
haven supporting area children and their families.10
Other social enterprises supplying transformative products or services
include: Nashville, Tennessee’s Soles4Souls, which (among other things)
takes donations of new and used shoes and distributes them to those
who need them;11 Jared Allen’s Homes for Wounded Warriors, which
raises funds and in-kind contributions “to build and remodel handicap
accessible homes to suit the individual needs of our injured United
States military veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan”;12 and New
York’s Safe Passage Project, which provides free legal services to
immigrant children.13
Social enterprises organized to donate back “contribute a portion
of their profits to nonprofits that address basic unmet needs.”14 These
include Nashville Tennessee’s Songs Against Slavery, which “empowers
and inspires communities to join the fight against sex trafficking in the
United States . . . [by raising] awareness and funds through benefit
concerts and musician partnerships.”15 A longstanding example of a
firm that donates back is Newman’s Own, a food and beverage firm
founded by actor Paul Newman that donates all of its profits to
charitable causes.16
Businesses of this kind are complex. They engage commercial
enterprise to serve social or environmental aims. They do exist to make
Welcome
to
the
Love
Kitchen,
THE
LOVE
https://www.thelovekitchen.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
10

KITCHEN,

INC.,

See About Us, SOLES4SOULS, https://soles4souls.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2019) (“Soles4Souls creates sustainable jobs and provides relief through the
distribution of shoes and clothing around the world.”). Souls4Souls also works with
micro-enterprise firms in developing countries to support entrepreneurs interested in
starting shoe businesses—meaning that it also is an employment opportunity social
enterprise. See FAQ: What do you do with the shoes you receive?, SOLES4SOULS,
https://soles4souls.org/faq/. Other social enterprises also operate in more than one
type of social enterprise.
11

12 Mission

and History: Foundation Mission, JARED ALLEN’S HOMES FOR WOUNDED
WARRIORS, https://www.homesforwoundedwarriors.com/mission-history/ (last visited
Jan. 11, 2019).
See About Us: Who We Are, SAFE PASSAGE PROJECT,
https://www.safepassageproject.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (“We provide
free lawyers to refugee and immigrant children in the NYC-area who face deportation
back to life-threatening situations, despite their strong legal claim to stay in the US.”).
13
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SOC. ENTER. ALL., supra note 4

Our Mission, SONGS AGAINST SLAVERY, https://songsagainstslavery.org/about-us/
(last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
15

See 100% Profits to Charity, NO LIMIT, LLC, https://www.newmansown.com/100percent-profits-to-charity/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
16
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profit, and part of any profit enures to the advantage of the firm’s
intended social or environmental beneficiaries. The extent to which
other internal and external constotuents may also derive banafit from
those profits may depend on the legal form in which the social enterprise
is organized.
As a result of this complexity, lawyers who advise social
enterprises are best counseled, consistent with that advisory role, to
understand the nature of social enterprise in more than just a legal sense.
The American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide
in relevant part that “[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”17 The
same rules require the legal advisor to “exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice.”18 Given the relative
complexity of advising business principals and businesses generally–and
the additional levels of decision-making required to represent social
enterprises–a broad comprehension of social enterprise and the
environment in which it operates–drawn from legal and non-legal
traditions–seems wise, if not essential.
II. CHOOSING THE RIGHT BUSINESS ENTITY
FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISES
How do social enterprises organize themselves, from a legal
standpoint? There are many options. Each has its advantages and
disadvantages. In the current social enterprise environment, specific
areas of tension in corporate law compound this general complexity.
Having said that, it seems wise to start with the general issues in entity
selection and work our way toward the specific, contentious corporate
law issues. Social enterprise entity formation issues test a lawyer’s duty
of competence—“legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation”19—in multiple ways.
Of course, founders and promoters of social enterprise can
remain sole proprietors or, if desired, form unincorporated business
associations (i.e., partnerships, limited liability partnerships, limited
partnerships, limited liability companies, or where available, low-profit
limited liability companies—a specialized form of limited liability
company designed for use by social enterprises) or incorporate in one of
several forms. New corporate forms have proliferated in the past ten
17

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).

18

Id.

Id. at r. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
19
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years, making corporate choices more textured (and, for some, more
confusing or contentious). In essence, the traditional choice of
incorporating as a non-profit corporation or a for-profit corporation has
expanded to include, in a majority of states, a third (and sometimes a
fourth) option to incorporate as one of several different types of forprofit social enterprise corporation. Accordingly, while the spectrum of
organizational choices still extends from sole proprietorships through
unincorporated business associations to nonprofit and for-profit
corporations, the range of options in that spectrum has increased.
This wider variety of choices makes the lawyer’s task in assisting
the client more demanding. In an earlier essay, I noted the challenges
that alternative entities bring to choice of entity decisions in general.20 I
stated there that “[t]he substantial change and complexity presented to
legal counsel by the introduction of alternative forms of business entity
over the past quarter century test a business lawyer’s ability to exercise
ethical professional judgment at multiple junctures and in myriad ways.”21
Add to the evolution and intricacy of legal rules that I noted in that
essay both the new corporate law options for organizing social enterprise
firms and the multi-faceted social enterprise business models described
in Part I, and the professional stresses mount.
Although various state laws offer a number of distinctive,
specialized social enterprise corporate forms,22 most states offer three
principal options for the incorporation of a social enterprise: a
conventional non-profit corporation and a traditional for-profit
corporation, as well as a benefit corporation, a for-profit corporation
that operates under tailored, narrow management and governance
constraints geared to a public purpose. 23 Under Tennessee law, for
example, a social enterprise desiring to incorporate may choose to
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Professional Responsibility in an Age of Alternative Entities,
Alternative Finance, and Alternative Facts, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 227 (2017).
20

Id. at 234; see also Eric H. Franklin, A Rational Approach to Business Entity Choice, 64 U.
KAN. L. REV. 573, 575 (2016) (noting the existence of “an increasingly complex array
of business entity options for potential business owners”).
21

See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 27–28
(2015) [hereinafter Murray, An Early Report] (noting “the formation
of benefit corporations, . . . flexible purpose corporations, general benefit corporations,
public benefit corporations, social purpose corporations, specific benefit corporations,
and sustainable business corporations.”).
22

See, e.g., McDonnell, Committing, supra note 2, at 21 (“Lawyers and legislators have
begun to invent hybrid legal forms to meet the needs of these hybrid businesses. The
most important of these new forms is the benefit corporation.”); Murray, An Early
Report, supra note 23, at 28 (avowing, after listing forms of social enterprise entity, that
“[t]he benefit corporation form has emerged as the most popular social
enterprise statute type,”).
23
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organize as a non-profit corporation, 24 a traditional for-profit
corporation,25 or a for-profit benefit corporation.26 Some commentators
contextualize the benefit corporation (among other social enterprise
forms of entity) as a hybrid form of corporation, inhabiting a place
somewhere between the customary non-profit and for-profit corporate
forms.27
Non-profit
Corporation

Benefit
Corporation

Traditional
For-profit
Corporation

This relative positioning of the benefit corporation form between the
non-profit and traditional for-profit corporate forms is accurate but
incomplete. Indeed, benefit corporations are for-profit corporations
under both federal tax law and state corporate law (enabling them to
offer pecuniary gain—a private benefit—to funders through the
ownership of an equity interest in the business) with public-facing aims
like that of a non-profit corporation. But it is not quite that simple.
The core distinctive legal rules governing benefit corporation law
are novel and unique to the benefit corporation form. Professor Brett

24

See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-51-101 – 48-68-211 (2019).

25

See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101 – 48-28-109 (2019).

26

See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-101 – 48-27-103 (2019).

See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 22, at 582 (observing that “[t]he organizations in the
hybrid category have experienced remarkable growth in recent years, and include such
legal forms as benefit corporations . . . .”); John Tyler et al., Producing Better Mileage:
Advancing the Design and Usefulness of Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business Ventures, 33
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 237 (2015) (noting the proliferation of the benefit
corporation and other social enterprise forms and explaining that “[t]he term ‘hybrid’
refers to rules in enabling statutes that blend aspects of traditional for-profit ventures
(such as private investors) with characteristics normally associated with traditional nonprofit entities (such as charitable or other social benefit purposes).”); Katherine R. Lofft
et al., Are Hybrids Really More Efficient? A ‘Drive-by’ Analysis of Alternative Company
Structures, BUS. L. TODAY, Sept. 2012, at 1 (referencing “an increasing variety of new
models or forms of so-called ‘hybrid’ business organization, which are intended to
provide more flexibility, and a measure of legal protection, to organizations that want
to ‘do well by doing good.’”).
27
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McDonnell succinctly explains the characteristic governance norms in
benefit corporation law in a recently published article:
[B]enefit corporations . . . impose fiduciary duty . . .
requirements. The directors and officers of a benefit
corporation must consider the effects of their actions on
a variety of specified interests, including employees,
customers, the community, the environment, and the
ability of the company to generate a general public
benefit. Shareholders may sue if they believe a company’s
directors and officers have violated this duty, although
their remedies are limited. Nonshareholder constituencies
(e.g. employees or customers) do not have the right to
sue to enforce the duty to consider their interests,
although companies may grant standing by agreement.28
In most states, benefit corporations also have a state-law filing
requirement additional to the required filing of an annual report. They
must file a “benefit report.” “In these reports, companies must say what
they have done to pursue general public benefit, along with any specific
public purpose they may have. This must be measured against an
independent third-party standard . . . .”29 Lawyers offering advice on
business entity choice must be conversant with and competent in
advising on these innovative benefit corporation rules as well as the
formation, structure, governance, financing, and third-party liability rules
of conventional non-profit corporations and traditional for-profit
corporations.
That general depiction of a benefit corporation also may
understate the level of knowledge required to engage in capable
representation of a social enterprise or its constituents. Of course, not
all state non-profit or traditional for-profit corporation laws are the
same. 30 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that within the benefit
corporation form, there also are a number of different state statutory
models.31 In other words, different states have adopted different forms
28

McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure, supra note 4, at 94–95 (footnotes omitted).

29

Id. at 95.

See Kelli A. Alces, Legal Diversification, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1977, 2022-23 (2013)
(“Corporate law presents . . . a law market . . . . States can choose different corporate
governance laws and firms can then choose where they want to incorporate.”); Lynn M.
LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2131 (2018) “Each state
assembles and offers a corporate-law package consisting of a corporation law, a method
for amending it, a judicial system, and an administrative agency.”).
30

See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S.
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 616-25 (2017) (offering examples, in the
text and referenced appendices, of different state benefit corporation laws) [hereinafter
Heminway, Corporate Purpose]; McDonnell, Committing, supra note 2, at 30–31 (describing
31
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of benefit corporation, magnifying further the number of options a
social entrepreneur or business promoter has for legally organizing a
social enterprise business. A business lawyer must understand the
individual state law similarities and differences in all three types of
corporation, as well as the similarities and differences in all applicable
unincorporated business forms in order to offer professionally
responsible legal advice on entity formation in a social enterprise
context. And the lawyer must then be able to use this knowledge in
context to advise the principals of the social enterprise in the selection
of a business form based on the then available facts.
Assuming formation and maintenance costs can be managed, the
lawyer’s contextual analysis typically focuses on three key potential points
of difference that may distinguish the reasonable expectations of
principals of one social enterprise from those of another in a way that is
determinative of the lawyer’s recommendation on choice of entity:
•

Entity-level federal and state income tax obligations
and benefits (which may depend on, e.g., whether the
social enterprise is anticipated to operate exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
purposes, whether the activities of the social
enterprise are expected to include influencing
legislation or participating or intervening in any
political campaign for or against any candidate for
public office, and whether the business model
proposed for the social enterprise incorporates the
possibility of paying federal or state taxes on business
income—all of which help distinguish a non-profit
social enterprise exempt from federal and state
income taxation from an income-tax-paying forprofit corporate social enterprise);32

different benefit corporation statute models: B Lab, Delaware, and Minnesota); J.
Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee's For-Profit Benefit Corporation Law, 19
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 325, 328-30 (2017) (outlining two principal statutory
models and presenting Tennessee’s statute as a third model—and an outlier).
See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018) (exempting certain specified corporations from
federal income taxation). A number of subsidiary issues are embedded in the federal
income tax status of the firm that may affect founder and promoter decisions on the
choice of an appropriate legal entity. See generally Yaniv Heled et. al., Why Healthcare
Companies Should Be(Come) Benefit Corporations, 60 B.C. L. REV. 73, 120–21 (2019)
(describing generally attributes of nonprofit and for-profit corporations that affect
decisions on a choice of entity). For example, the limitations on salaries for executives
and other employees of tax-exempt entities, as well as the general restrictions on
distributions of corporate assets to employees in tax-exempt firms, may be
important—or even dispositive.
32
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Benefits available to presumed funders (including
whether prospective funders may want a tax
deduction, credit, or other tax benefit or whether
they may desire to share in the profits of the venture,
which would promote or preclude organization of
the social enterprise as a tax-exempt non-profit
corporation);33 and
Management governance obligations, including
fiduciary duties (for instance, whether corporate
directors and officers will expect or require flexibility
in determining the nature and objectives of their
decision making, which provides insights into
whether the structured decision making and
management duties of a benefit corporation may
make that for-profit corporate form a beneficial
choice in organizing under an individual state’s
corporate law).34

•

•

A significant level of diligence is required to obtain the relevant facts—
information sufficient to perform the required analysis. “A lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence . . . in representing a client.”35
Yet, even a lawyer who can effectively access and acquire
accurate and complete information from social enterprise entrepreneurs,
founders, or promoters relating to these three matters may find it
difficult to offer definitive advice to social enterprise venturers. The
three areas of inquiry may point in different directions, and while the
first two areas of inquiry may offer relatively clear solutions, the vagaries
of the law on social enterprise decision-making in the corporate form
raise particularly thorny choice-of-entity issues. These legal challenges
are described in Part III.
III.

ADVISING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT
ON DECISION-MAKING

The business law advisor’s challenge in working with social
enterprises does not end once the selection of an appropriate entity has
been made and the organization of the firm has been accomplished.
Lawyers advising social enterprise management on ongoing decision
making also confront difficult issues, especially when management
perceives or knows that it must make a relatively stark choice (in an
See, e.g., id. §§ 170 & 501 (establishing tax deductions for charitable and other
contributions and gifts and restricting the conferral of more than incidental private
benefits on private shareholders or individuals).
33

34

See infra Part III.

35

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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individual circumstance or a series of circumstances) between generating
short-term or long-term profit for financial interest holders and serving
the firm’s social or environmental purpose. This choice may be
especially tough for management of a social enterprise organized as a
for-profit corporation. In the for-profit corporate form, legal pressure
may exist at the intersection of shareholder wealth maximization and the
pursuit of the social enterprise firm’s public social or environmental
benefit.
In making decisions involving trade-offs between maximizing the
financial wealth of the venture for equity owners and serving the firm’s
mission, corporate officers and directors in a for-profit social enterprise
may risk transgressing statutory management mandates or breaching
their fiduciary duties.36 Even when the law provides some clarity, lawyers
often must exercise reasoned discretion in helping clients choose from
among multiple possible approaches or actions. Thus, in a business
management decision-making context (as in a choice-of-entity context),
rational legal analyses may not result in clear choices; a lawyer’s
professional responsibility and professionalism are both tested. Lawyers
working with social enterprises in that decision-making context—
perhaps especially those representing social enterprises organized as
benefit corporations, given theor novel and untested nature—must be
fully conversant with the evolving applicable law and lore.37 Even a
lawyer competent in corporate governance must exercise diligence in
keeping up with current statutory and decisional law, as well as practice
norms.38

See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let's Not Give Up on Traditional for-Profit
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 787 (2018)
[hereinafter Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up] (“The outcome of any controversy regarding
the application of the shareholder wealth maximization norm to management decisionmaking for a sustainable social enterprise firm organized as a for-profit corporation is
likely to be dependent on many factors . . . .”).
36

The first comment to Rule 1.1 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct readily comes to mind.
37

In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge
and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative
complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer's general
experience, the lawyer's training and experience in the field in
question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the
matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in
question.
Id. r. 1.1 cmt. 1.
Id.; see also id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer should . . . take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.”).
38
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The major battleground in the corporate law governing social
enterprises is the for-profit corporate law regarding the objectives of the
decision-making of the board of directors and the corporate
constituents that decision making must and may serve.
Legal
consternation created by a few judicial opinions (from courts in different
states issued in a variety of corporate contextst over a period spanning
more than 100 years) challenges the nature and focus of board decisionmaking in the traditional for-profit corporation.39 Those opinions may
be read to require corporate directors to maximize shareholder wealth in
every decision they make or to impose an overall decision-making norm
to that effect—a shareholder wealth maximization norm—in all board
proceedings.40 Numerous books, articles and other papers, and later
judicial decisions have identified, described, and parsed these opinions
and various versions of an ostensible shareholder wealth maximization
rule or norm. Despite this extensive commentary, there is not academic
or practical agreement on the extent to which corporate directors must
act to maximize shareholder wealth in each decision they make. It may
nevertheless be clear, however, that directors must not disregard the
effects of their decision-making on shareholder wealth.
The benefit corporation arose in major part from a desire to
offer a for-profit corporate form of entity in which management would
not be required to maximize shareholder wealth in every decision made.41
As a result, benefit corporation statutes govern, among other things,
what a benefit corporation board of directors must consider or balance
in its decision making, as well as the nature and objective of the
directors’ fiduciary duties. 42 While this black-letter codification of
management process and duties is designed to be helpful to benefit
corporation directors and to the legal advisors counseling benefit
corporation directors on the exercise of their decision-making
responsibilities, the benefit is somewhat illusory. The application of the
statutory standards in specific contexts may not be straightforward, and
the constraints on board decision-making may result in attorneys
recommending processes that do not improve—and may harm—the
substantive quality of the board’s decisions in promoting the mission of
the social enterprise, exposing the directors to potential liability in
shareholder litigation.
See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of
Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 950–56
(2017) (identifying and summarizing these court opinions).
39

40

See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 22, at 612–15.

41

See Heminway, Corporate Purpose, supra note 31, at 617 n.24 (2017)

For a more detailed discussion of these aspects of benefit corporations, see id. at
621–25
42
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Although the exact standards vary from statute to statute, state
benefit corporation statutes typically require directors to “consider” or
“balance” the interests of specific constituencies and the firm’s public
benefit in making decisions.43 They also clarify, among other things, the
lack of a shareholder wealth maximization norm (or even shareholder
interest primacy) 44 or that an informed, disinterested director’s
New Jersey’s law provides an example of a statute mandating consideration of
interests:
43

The board of directors . . . shall consider the effects of any action
upon: (1) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; (2) the
employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and its
subsidiaries and suppliers; (3) the interests of customers as
beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the
benefit corporation; (4) community and societal considerations,
including those of any community in which offices or facilities of
the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries or suppliers are located; (5)
the local and global environment; and (6) the short-term and longterm interests of the benefit corporation, including benefits that may
accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the benefit corporation . . . .
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a) (2011). The Tennessee statute offers another type of
consideration requirement:
In discharging the duties of the position of director of a for-profit
benefit corporation, a director shall consider the effects of any
contemplated, proposed, or actual transaction or other conduct on
the interests of those materially affected by the corporation's
conduct, including the pecuniary interests of shareholders, and the
public benefit or public benefits identified in its charter . . . .
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2018); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-104(d)
(2018) (“A for-profit benefit corporation shall be managed in a manner that considers
the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, including
the pecuniary interests of shareholders, and the public benefit or public benefits
identified in its charter.”). The New Jersey statute also permits the consideration of
other matters and factors. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(b) (2018). The Delaware statute
requires a balancing of interests. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2019) (“The board
of directors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit
corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and the specific
public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(a) (2018). In New Jersey’s 2018 legislative session,
a bill was introduced to require both a consideration and balancing of interests by
directors in their decision-making. S. 2260, 218th Legis., § 2 (N.J. 2018), available at
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/S2500/2260_I1.HTM.
E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(c) (2003 & Supp. 2018) (“The board of directors . . .
shall not be required to give priority to the interests of any particular person or group
referred to in subsection a. or subsection b. of this section over the interests of any
other person or group unless the benefit corporation has stated its intention to give
priority to interests related to a specific public benefit purpose identified in its
44

810

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

compliance with the required decision-making standard satisfies the
director’s applicable fiduciary duties. 45 However, the articulation of
management duties—including fiduciary duties—in the various state
benefit corporation statutes is far from clear when applied in specific
decision-making contexts.46
The statutory duties provide no real guidance as to how
to measure and balance the effects on different
interests—they merely list the interests that directors and
officers must consider. Even if the legal advisors force
boards to put in the record that they have considered
each of these interests before making a decision, those
records could easily become pro forma checklists. Case
law could ultimately provide more detailed and nuanced
guidance, but so far, there are no cases, and the limited
chances of success may mean that the case law never
develops (as has been the case, for instance, with
constituency statutes).47
Unless and until the law further develops, these uncertainties will
complicate the legal advisory context for lawyers representing social
enterprises organized as benefit corporaitons.
For some, the more pointed expression of management duties in
benefit corporation statutes represents an undesirable constraint on
board processes that may impair or impede quality decision-making,
taken alone or viewed in the overall context of the statutory scheme.
Management may rely on facial compliance with the statutory rules as
both a liability shield and,perhaps mistakenly, a validation of the
substantive effect of their actions.

certificate of incorporation.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-106(a) (2012 & Supp. 2018)
(“[A] director . . . shall not give regular, presumptive, or permanent priority to the
interests of any individual constituency or limited group of constituencies materially
affected by the corporation’s conduct, including the pecuniary interests of
shareholders.”).
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b) (2011 & Supp. 2018) (“[W]ith respect to a
decision implicating the balance requirement in subsection (a) of this section, [a
director of a public benefit corporation] will be deemed to satisfy such director's
fiduciary duties to stockholders and the corporation if such director's decision is both
informed and disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment
would approve.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-506(b) (West 2017).
45

See McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure, supra note 4, at 96 (“[T]he duty . . .
requirements leave it quite vague regarding how to measure the impact on the various
interests, and even more vague as to how companies should balance the impacts on
differing, and sometimes competing, interests.”).
46

47

Id. at 97 (footnote omitted).
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Directors and officers who want to paint a pretty, green picture
of how they are benefiting the planet will probably be able to evade legal
liability for either violating their duties or for securities fraud in their
misleading disclosures. More subtly, directors and officers of benefit
corporations are likely to strongly believe that they are doing good, and
the vague standards of the statutes will not provide a strong reality check
against the power of self-belief.48
Indeed, slavish adherence to statutory decision-making and
liability standards may enable benefit corporation directors to ultimately
avoid liability for their actions. However, that statutory obedience may
unduly restrict the field of vision and focus of the board and, as a result,
also may limit director judgment and discretion in ways that could
handicap the board’s ability to make optimal decisions—decisions that
benefit shareholders as well as other firm stakeholders.49 The business
judgment rule was introduced to the judicial review of management
decision-making at least in part to allow open-textured decisionmaking—risk-taking through the free exercise of a director’s experienced
judgment and discretion.50 Professor Steve Bainbridge reinforces this
notion when he offers that, “[g]iven the significant virtues of discretion,
. . . one must not lightly interfere with management or the board’s
decision-making authority in the name of accountability. Preservation of
managerial discretion should always be the null hypothesis.”51
Even if benefit corporation directors and officers endeavor to
strictly observe the statutory constraints on their decision-making, they
still may be subjected to shareholder claims based on their actions. This
litigation may be a lengthy, complex, expensive process. In a legal action
for breach of fiduciary duty, for example, plaintiffs will face many
48

Id. at 97 (footnotes omitted).

See Heminway, Corporate Purpose, supra note 31, at 634 (“Under applicable rules in
some state benefit corporation statutes, the board must consider the effects of its
conduct on specific constituencies as well as the corporation’s charter-based public
benefit or public benefits. This statutory requirement decreases the discretion afforded
to corporate management (by specifically defining what management must consider)
and limits the need for and reliance on
49

management expertise.” (footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (overruled on other grounds
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (“The business judgment rule exists to
protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to
Delaware directors.”); Sandra K. Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to
Members and Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 21, 41 (1994)
(“The policy underlying the rule encourages risk taking, innovation, and creative
entrepreneurial activities.”).
50

Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 109 (2004).
51
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hurdles in successfully pleading and proving their claims. The
substantive law is new and experimental. Charter-based exculpation,
statutory limitations on liability, indemnification, or insurance may be
available, as well as the protections of the business judgment rule.52
With this type of litigation in mind, I observed in my prior work that
[t]he immutable rules specific to benefit corporations
create additional costs—costs associated with, e.g., . . .
untested structural and governance rules—that may not
provide a net benefit to shareholders and other investors.
These costs and attendant litigation risks also cast doubt
on the aggregate advantages of benefit corporations to
other stakeholders. None may feel well protected when
taking into account the overall effects of the benefit
corporation’s unique immutable rules.53
The costs may be particularly acute for publicly traded social enterprises
organized as benefit corporations.54
In light of the unclear statutory mandates governing benefit
corporation management decision-making and the possible impact of
their application in contexts where more open-textured decision-making
may be more desirable, lawyers representing social enterprises and their
principals should be aware of the possibility of and prospects for both
litigation and liability that result from benefit corporation director
decision-making. Moreover, these lawyers must be able to describe the
related risks to the directors as accurately and plainly as possible. In the
absence of decisional law, the lawyer must rely on experiential wisdom
from other contexts to provide the necessary advice.
This counseling context challenges the lawyer’s advisory and
communication skills and duties as a matter of professional
responsibility.
Legal counsel to social enterprises cannot offer
unequivocal, wooden legal advice. In this context, “[a]dvice couched in
narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where
practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are
52

See Heminway, Corporate Purpose, supra note 42, at 634.

As a general matter, assuming a viable fiduciary duty claim, the liability or financial
responsibility of corporate directors for breaches of fiduciary duty may be narrowed
through the application of up to four mandatory or permissive aspects
of corporate law. These include exculpation for breaches of the duty of care,
indemnification (statutory and privately ordered), director and officer liability insurance,
and the possible application of the business judgment rule in the judicial review
process. Id. (footnote omitted).
53

Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up, supra note 37, at 798.

See generally Heminway, supra note 41, at 625–45 (2017) (outlining key litigation risks
for publicly held U.S. benefit corporations).
54
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predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be
inadequate.”55 Consultation, mutuality, and patience are all required to
ensure effective communication and compliance with the lawyer’s
applicable professional responsibilities in service to the client.56
IV.

CONCLUSION

Advising entrepreneurs, founders, promoters, and management
of social enterprises can be both satisfying and frustrating. The
satisfaction most often comes from helping these businesses achieve
financial success while also serving the public good. The frustration
comes from the difficulty of the task in providing the necessary
counsel—both in selecting the optimal legal form for the firm and in
advising management as the business operates and decisions are made
over time. These legal advisory contexts involving social enterprises are
richly textured and immerse legal counsel in multilevel decision-making
that impacts both internal and external business constituencies. The
overall advisory environment implicates, among other things, hortatory
text in the Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
providing that “[a] lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill,
to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal
profession’s ideals of public service.”57 In lawyering for social enterprise,
the legal advisor’s skill and public service responsibilities interact
meaningfully.
Said another way, the complex decision-making involved in
lawyering for social enterprise presents obvious challenges for business
venturers and their legal counsel that involve not only baseline
professional responsibility matters of competence (comprising doctrinal
knowledge and solid, rational legal analysis), diligence (by offering
patient and perceptive insights in helping the client to choose from
among available alternatives), and communication (with the goal of
ensuring informed client decision-making), but also the exercise of
appropriate discretion and professionalism that requires the savvy built
from doctrinal, theoretical, and practical experience and leadership
capabilities. As Professor Jeff Lipshaw has written in his intriguing and
engaging book Beyond Legal Reasoning: A Critique of Pure Lawyering, “I am
firmly convinced that great lawyers . . . bring something more than keen
analytical skills to the table. They bring some kind of wisdom—a
metaphorical creativity—that transcends disciplinary boundaries, both
55

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.2.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).

See id. r. 1.4(a)(2), (b) (requiring reasonable consultation “with the client about the
means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished” and explanation of “a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.”).
56

57

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).

814

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

within the law and without.” 58 That brand of wisdom is especially
important in the kinds of questions that arise in lawyering for social
enterprise.
Accordingly, as lawyers representing social enterprises, we need
to develop a sensitivity to the various business models and related facts,
knowledge of a complex and novel set of laws, and well-practiced,
contextual legal reasoning skills. But that, while necessary, is insufficient
to the task. We also must impose judgment borne of a deep
understanding of the nature of social enterprise and of our clients and
their representatives working in that space. Only then can we fulfill our
professional promise as legal advisors: to provide clients with both “an
informed understanding of . . . legal rights and obligations” and an
explanation of “their practical implications.”59

JEFFREY LIPSHAW, BEYOND LEGAL REASONING: A CRITIQUE OF PURE LAWYERING
163 (2017). Profesor Alicia Plerhoples makes a similar point in the social enterprise
representation context when she observes that “[l]awyers encounter unstructured legal
problems throughout their careers; the competent or expert lawyer is able to apply their
knowledge, skills, practice judgment, and method of practice to resolve their clients'
unstructured problems.” Alicia E. Plerhoples, supra note 1, at 255.
58

59

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).

